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Striking a Difficult Balance:
Combatting the Threat of Neo-Nazism
in Germany While Preserving
Individual Liberties
ABSTRACT

Through violence, intolerance, and fascism, neo-Nazis
threaten the political and social structure of Germany's
democratic state. As the neo-Nazi movement continues to

grow throughout Germany, the German government faces the
difficult challenge of quelling the neo-Nazis. By invoking the
laws enacted to prevent the resurgence of Nazism, the
government has infringed upon basic individual liberties such
as freedom of expression and association. This Note
discusses the various devices implemented by both Germany
and the internationalcommunity to combat neo-Nazis, and the
effects these measures' have had on the neo-Nazis
themselves. This Note concludes that in attempting to strike
an appropriate balance between combatting neo-Nazis and
preserving individual liberties in Germany, the German
government may actually drive the neo-Nazi movement into
the mainstream, where its disguised message may find
broaderappeal.
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INTRODUCTION

Upon the conclusion of the Second World War, the German
people faced a daunting challenge.
The Germans sought to
emerge from their defeat at the hands of the Allies as a new and
formidable nation, worthy of acceptance and moral respect from
the world community. 1 To achieve this goal, the Germans would

have to prove to Europe and the rest of the world that their recent
Nazi history, responsible for the systematic extermination of
millions of innocent lives, would remain forever in the past.

1.
The Preamble of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) or Constitution,
enacted in 1949, prominently proclaims that "[t]he German People [are] ...

[a]nimated by the resolve.., to serve the peace of the world as an equal partner
in a united Europe, and [desire] to give a new order to political life." GRUNDGESETZ
[Constitution] [GG] pmbl. (F.R.G.), translatedin THE CONSITtION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988) 223, 226 [hereinafter Karpen].
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In the years following the Allied occupation, Germany began
its journey back to world acceptance. 2 The newly created Federal
4
Republic of Germany3 weaved provisions into its legal fabric that
were designed to make many of the fundamental tenets of Nazism
For example, the Basic Law, effectively Germany's
illegal. 5
Constitution, provides that political parties which do not conform
6
In addition,
with democratic principles are unconstitutional.
7
although Germany did not remilitarize until the 1950s, the
international community acted quickly to prevent the repetition of
8
Germany's Nazi past by adopting conventions that declared its
9
For
intolerance of the atrocities committed by the Nazis.
2.

For a useful overview of German history in this century, see MARY

FULBROOK, THE DIVIDED NAMON: A HISTORY OF GERMANY, 1918-1990 (1991).
East Germany, or the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was
3.
partitioned by the occupying forces following the war and remained a separate,
communist nation until its reunification with the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) in 1990. See FULBROOK, supra note 2, at 160-67. Notably, the Basic Law
was originally intended to be subject to change upon the reunification of Germany
and was therefore deemed temporary. For this reason the Basic Law was not
See also Gregory S.
Id. at 163.
accorded the official title "Constitution.0
McCurdy, Note, German Reunification: Historical and Legal Roots of Germany's
RapidProgress Towards Unity, 22 N.Y.U. J. INrL L. & POL. 253, 257 (1990).
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany was implemented in
4.
1949, during the period of Allied occupation immediately following World War II.
During the occupation of the German territory, the Allies repealed all of the Nazi
laws, and subjected the remaining laws to a rule under which no law could in any
way cause injustice or discriminate in favor of the Nazis. See NIGEL FOSTER,
GERMAN LAW & LEGAL SYSIEM 27 (1993).
For example, the Basic Law bans certain political parties, hate speech,
5.
and discrimination. GG art. 1(1), 21(2), translatedin Karpen at 227, 236.
Article 21(2) states:
6.
Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their
adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to
endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be
unconstitutional.
GG art. 21(2), Karpen at 236. For a more detailed discussion of Article 21(2), see
infra part IV.A.3.
FULBROOK, supra note 2, at 130.
7.
See, e.g., UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III), U.N.
8.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration];
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
Approximately six million Jews, 300,000 Gypsies, ten million Slavs,
9.
and 200,000 homosexuals were killed by the Nazi regime. For a more detailed
breakdown of the victims of the Holocaust, see R. J. RUMMEL, DEMOCIDE: NAZI
GENOCIDEAND MASS MURDER 85-101 & tbl. A (1992). See also A MOSAIC OFVICTIMS

(Michael Berenbaum ed., 1990); JOE J. HEYDECKER & JOHANNES LEEB, THE
NUREMBERG TRIAL 346-47 (R.A. Downe ed. & trans., 1962).
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example, the United Nations Charter itself, enacted in 1948,
proclaims equality for all men and women and upholds the
dignity and worth of all individuals.1 0
Despite the legal measures adopted by Germany and the
international community, groups and individuals espousing neoNazi ideals have organized followings across much of Germany in
the postwar years. These groups are outgrowths of the Nazi
regime itself; many of the leaders of the postwar neo-Nazi
movement were active participants and leaders in the Third
Reich.1 1 Today, a new generation of neo-Nazis threatens to
undermine much of the social and political progress Germany has
made over the past forty-five years. As a result, many of the laws
designed to prevent the resurgence of Nazism are now being

invoked.
This Note examines how the legal measures taken against
neo-Nazis may implicate individual liberties such as freedom of
expression and association. Part II of this Note analyzes the
political and social climate existing in post-war Germany that
allowed the government to take strong measures to curtail
Nazism, yet simultaneously provided fertile ground for the neoNazi movement. Part III discusses the magnitude of the current
neo-Nazi threat. Parts IV and V, respectively, examine the devices
employed by German and international authorities to ensure that
the atrocities of the Holocaust are never repeated. Part V also
analyzes the effect of these laws on the individual liberties of
those in the neo-Nazi movement. Finally, Part VI discusses the
effect that these attempts to combat the current neo-Nazi threat
have had upon the practices of neo-Nazis. This Note concludes
that although Germany may be justified in suppressing certain
types of speech and association, this suppression may actually
drive the neo-Nazi movement into the mainstream where its
disguised message may find an even larger audience.

For an examination of the extent to which the Germans, as a people, were a

de facto party to the Holocaust by providing the infrastructure under which it
occurred, see infra note 44.
10.
U.N. CHARIER pmbl.
11.
See RAND C. LEWIS, A NAZI LEGACY: RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN POST/AR
GERMANY xii (1991).
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II. POST-WORLD WAR II GERMANY

A. Denazification
As the Second World War came to an end, the victorious
Allied forces convened to devise a plan for the future of
Germany. 12 The Allies agreed, in principle, on three policy goals:
the demilitarization, denazification, and democratization of
Germany. 1 3 The Allies also agreed to divide Germany among
themselves into four separate zones of occupation 14 in which to
implement their policy goals.
The Allies initially envisioned a cooperative administration of
the occupied zones and the eventual emergence of Germany as a
single political unit. 15 However, during the occupation period
from 1945 to 1949, different policies emerged in the four zones as
"the aims and practices of all the occupying powers shifted
dramatically."16 The polarization of the western and eastern allies
17
intensified throughout the period of occupation, culminating in
when the Soviet Union cut off
the "Berlin Blockade" in 1948
18
Berlin from the western zones.
1. Trial and Error
9
In 1945, the Allies began the task of denazifying Germany.'
In the western zones, particularly the United States zone, the

The Allies held conferences in Yalta (February 4-11, 1945) and
12.
Potsdam (July 17-August 2, 1945). See FULBROOK, supranote 2, at 131-32.
Id.
13.
The four zones were occupied by the United States, the Soviet Union,
14.

Great Britain, and France. Originally, the Allies divided Germany into three parts
of substantially equal population. The original zones went to the United States,
the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, leaving the Soviets with the greatest
geographical land area spanning most of eastern Germany. The Yalta conference

allocated a fourth zone to France. Although the United States and Great Britain
argued that France's zone should be taken from the Soviet Union's larger land
area, this zone was carved out of the United States and British zones to the west.
See FULBROOK, supranote 2, at 130-32.
See Peter E. Quint, The ConstitutionalLaw of German Unification, 50
15.
MD. L. REV. 475,480 (1991).
FULBROOK, supranote 2, at 134.
16.
Id. at 160-67.
17.
Id. at 158. The "Berlin Blockade," which lasted from June 1948 to
18.
May 1949, effectively isolated Berlin from the rest of the world, cutting off all
road, rail, and water routes to the city. The western allies were forced to air-drop
food and basic supplies to Berliners for almost one year. Id.
The general Allied philosophy of denazification has been summarized
19.
as follows:
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Western Allies approached denazification from an individual and
psychological level. 20

The denazification process was originally

designed to purge from office all German officials who were known

members of, or collaborators with, the Nazi Party. 2 1 In addition to
targeting individuals affiliated with the Nazi Party, the Allies also
proscribed all Nazi organizations and institutions, and confiscated
2
property believed to have belonged to the Nazi Party.2
The Western Allies' individual approach to denazification
became a logistical juggernaut. First, definitively identifying
individuals who were legitimate targets of the purge was
difficult. 23 The criteria used to identify Nazis were less than exact
classifications of individuals, which frustrated the ability of the
Allied authorities to make swift and consistent identifications for
the purpose of making arrests.2 4 Second, eradicating the vestiges
of Nazism from Germany required tremendous amounts of effort
and resources. 25 While membership in the Nazi Party itself
established a legitimate, bright-line rule for arrests, U.S.
authorities estimated that there were millions of other Germans
who belonged to affiliated organizations, but escaped the
denazification effort. 2 6 Consequently, implementation of the
denazification program was arbitrary and incomplete at best.
Finally, even when the denazification program successfully
removed identified Nazis from various government and civic

[I]n some way, Germany must be cleansed of Nazis, that those guilty of
sustaining Nazi rule must be punished, and that it was essential, if future
peace was to be secured, that Germans should be convinced of the error of
Nazi views and persuaded to assent to more democratic and peaceful
values.
Id. at 141.

20.

Id. at 144.

21.
See id. This program called for the systematic firing of all officials and
administrators throughout all levels of national and local government who were
affiliated with the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP), known as
the Nazi Party. Id. For example, the Allied Control Council issued Directive
Number 24, which explicitly required the removal of Nazis from government
offices and positions of responsibility. Id. at 29.
22.
See LEWIS, supranote 11, at 29.
23.
The Control Council proffered a set of criteria for the arrest of those
who were "more than nominally involved in the Nazis program." Id. These criteria
included those who had held national or local office, authorized or participated in
Nazi atrocities or Nazi discrimination, avowed continual belief in Nazism, and
those who "voluntarily gave substantial moral or material support or political
assistance to the NSDAP." Id. (citing Control Council, Official Gazette 5 (March
31, 1946) at 98).
24.
"[T]he task became one of trying to find appropriate external indices or
evidence for internal predispositions and states of mind." FULBROOK, supra note
2, at 144.
25.
LEWIS, supranote 11, at 30.
26.
Id.
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positions, removing these administrators adversely affected the
communities they served. 27 Vacancies created by the removal of
filled by less experienced
otherwise able administrators were often
28
suffered.
communities
the
and
persons,
Both the Allies and the German people became skeptical of
the denazification program because of its inherent inadequacies
and inefficiencies. 2 9 In fact, in the zones occupied by the West,
"efforts towards denazification rapidly turned into an enormous
This bureaucratic machine affected
bureaucratic machine."30
German society psychologically by confrming a sense of self-pity
31
and victimization among the majority of the German population.
Ironically, on an individual level, the denazification program
stimulated a sense that the German masses were not responsible
for the Holocaust, which enabled the culpable Mitldufer32 to
perceive themselves as more akin to victims than perpetrators of
the Holocaust.33
2. Cold War Strategies
By 1948 the Cold War had begun, and the Allied powers had
tailored their occupation strategies according to their respective
goals and desires. In the Soviet occupation zone, the Soviet
Union placed greater emphasis on denazification through the
dismantling of German industry than on implementing a
denazification strategy also focused on individuals. 3 4 In this
effort to denazify Germany, the Soviet Union radically
transformed the social and economic organization of its eastern
zone. 3 5 This reorganization also focused on educational reform,

27.
28.
29.

Id. at 33-34.
Id.
Id. at 32. Because of these inadequacies, the Allies shifted the focus of

their efforts from an individualistic denazification program to the denazification
and dismantling of German industry, which the Allies perceived as the
cornerstone of the Nazi program. Id. at 29. For a discussion of the Soviet Union's
denazification program, see infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
30.
Alf Lfidtke, Coming to Terms with the Past: !llusions of Remembering,
Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany, 65 J. MOD. HIST. 542, 549 (1993).

In attempting to make determinations of whether suspected Nazis met the
proffered criteria for discharge from specific duties, the Allies' backlog in
processing dossiers reached into the thousands. See LEWIS, supra note 11, at 33.
Lfidtke, supra note 30, at 549.
31.
Mitldufer, which literally translates as "fellow travelers," is the term
32.
used to classify the "registered people," members of the Nazi party or its affiliates.
Id.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
LEWIS, supra note 11, at 34.
FULBROOK, supra note 2, at 145.
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resulting in the systematic discharge and replacement of teachers

who were former members of the Nazi Party.3 6 Moreover, the
Soviet Union altered the educational system to conform to its own

socialist views, for example, by offering evening classes on
37
Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
The advent of the Cold War also caused the United States to
change its occupation strategy.
The U.S. authorities, who
preferred a well-functioning German economy and efficient
administration to counter the Soviet transformation, pressed for a
quick end to the cumbersome denazification effort. 38
Consequently, by 1949 many former Nazis were reintroduced into
German society,3 9 and the goal of eradicating Nazism from
Germany was never fulfilled.
By 1949 the rift in relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union made Germany's reunification unlikely. 4 ° The
Cold War resulted in the division of Germany into two separate
states: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) or West Germany,
formerly occupied by the American, British, and French forces,
and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) or East Germany,
formerly occupied by the Soviet Union. 4 1 Thus, while East
Germany remained a communist state under the auspices
of the
42
Soviet Union, West Germany established a democracy.
36.
Id. It was estimated that by 1949, new teachers accounted for over
80% of the lower school staff in the Soviet zone, and in 1948 two-thirds of all
teachers were under the age of thirty-five. Id.
37.
Id. at 145-46.
38.
See LWidtke, supra note 30, at 550. The United States recognized the
potential harmful effects of further depleting the western zone of capable
administrators and industrial leaders. Id.
39.
LEWIS, supra note 11, at 37. Disarray in the administration of the
denazification program facilitated many former Nazis' reentry into German
society. For example, those who were able to convince the occupying authorities
of their active resistance to the Nazi regime could circumvent the system-and
avoid being purged-by obtaining a category "W" classification, which enabled
them to reenter the West German work force. Id.
40.
National unification was regarded by Germans as a lofty goal that,
under the new world order, could never be achieved. Yet the Germans still
"universally invoked [national unification] as an unavoidable piety, but with a
degree of commitment directly proportional to the perceived likelihood of its
impossibility." Steven Muller, Democracy in Germany, DAEDALUS, Winter 1994, at
36.
41.
The first national elections in West Germany were held on August 14,
1949, three months after the approval and signing of the West German Basic Law.
East Germany was formally established on October 7, 1949. FULBROOK, supra
note 2, at 164.
42.
Generally, both West Germany and Western Europe acknowledged the

seemingly insurmountable ideological and political differences and difficulties in
establishing a single, unified Germany in the foreseeable future. Thus, the
collective West focused on the economic and political reconstruction of Europe
without regard for Eastern Europe, which the West deemed "firmly and perhaps
forever in the grip of Soviet imperialism." Id.
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B. Confrontingthe Nazi Past

Notwithstanding the efforts to create a democratic West
Germany, the denazification efforts of the occupation period were
unsuccessful. In particular, the many Nazis who remained active
in West Germany threatened to undermine the new West German

democracy and its ideals.4

Thus, the West German government

needed to prove to the world, especially its European neighbors,
that it would never allow its recent 4Nazi past to recur and that it
4
would reject proponents of Nazism.

1. Repression
During the years following the formation of West Germany, a
tension emerged between the government's attempt to repudiate
Nazism by educating its populace about its Nazi past,4 5 and the
population's resistance to remembering this past. 4 6 Even before
the official creation of the country in 1949, West German society
showed signs that confronting its Nazi past would not be an easy
The difficulty in remembering the Nazi era can be
task. 47
In the immediate postwar period, roughly 15-18% of the adults in West
43.
Germany were unreconstructed Nazis. LEWIS, supra note 11, at 38 (citing
ABRAHAM ASHKENASI, MODERN GERMAN NATIONALISM 59 (1976)). Furthermore,
former members of the SS (Schutzstaffel, Hitler's elite police force) and other Nazi
sympathizers continued to hold gatherings and meetings as well as distribute
informational newsletters. Id.
One commentator described the enormity of the Holocaust in terms of
44.
social and moral responsibility:
What set the Holocaust apart was the unprecedented application of
industrial technology and the factory-based manufacturing process to the
extermination of several million human beings. This was neither a
sudden, brief, and uncontrollable explosion of rage, nor merely the work of
a few. Instead, what those who conceived and ordered this extermination
called the "Final Solution" was a systematically planned and efficiently
executed program to create and operate a new industry solely and
explicitly for the purpose of mass murder. Thousands of people were
employed in this process: collecting and transporting the victims, storing
and putting them to work while in storage, exterminating them, and
disposing as productively as possible any usable remains-for example, fat
drained from the cremation process was used to make soap. These
thousands worked at such tasks not just for weeks and months, but for
several years. Their work in the murder industry was the source of their
daily bread.
Muller, supranote 40, at 33-34.

45.

The government was not interested in fostering any form of German

nationalism at this early stage of rebuilding. See FULBROOK, supra note 2, at 304.
See Lfidtke, supra note 30, at 557.
46.
47.
This attitude can be illustrated by examining trends found in the
German press and publishing industry. Until 1947, among the books published
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attributed to a sense of guilt, 48 as well as a sense of
vulnerability. 4 9 In fact, in an attempt to alleviate the guilt
associated with the acts perpetrated by the Nazis, the West
German government established a compensation program
designed to repay victims of Nazi war crimes."0 However, on the
whole, through the 1950s the German population still repressed
its Nazi past.5 1
While the general population ignored or repressed memories
of the Nazi era,5 2 the emerging neo-Nazi movement spurred a
resurgence of anti-Semitic ideology and actions,5 3 leading to the
widespread desecrations of Jewish cemeteries and cultural sites

on the Third Reich, the largest group consisted of diaries by survivors from
concentration camps. See id. at 550 (citing Helmut Peitsch, "Autobiographical
Writing as VergangenheitsbewdItigung(Mastering the Past)," 7 GERMAN HISr. 47,
70 (1989)). In 1947 and 1948, however, these diaries were met with increasing
skepticism by reviewers in the publishing journals, who began criticizing these
personal accounts for the authors' lack of objectivity and lack of "distance
towards themselves," calling instead for "more appropriate forms of artistic and
fictional presentation." Id.
In addition, a statistical study in 1987 analyzed studied the political leanings
of Germans who were young adults during the Nazi Era. The study concluded
that the "Nazi Generation," as a group, lagged initially in embracing the new West
German democracy, but its views did subsequently converge with those of other
cohorts. See Frederick D. Weil, Cohorts, Regimes, and the Legitimation of
Democracy: West Germany Since 1945, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 308, 321 (1987). "It has
been recognized... that the young generations after 1945 maintained a residual
attachment to the Nazi regime and skepticism towards democracy .... " Id. at
310 (citing ANNA J. MERRrTT & RICHARD MERRrITr, PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED
GERMANY: THE OMGUS SURVEYS, 1945-1949, (1970)).
48.
The general treatment of the Holocaust by the West Germans in its
histories has been summarized as follows: "[A] sad story, we raise our hands in
horror or hang our heads in shame, this exonerates us, and fortunately it is all
over now." FULBROOK, supranote 2, at 107.
49.
Recalling the atrocities of the Holocaust necessarily sparked vivid
emotions, yet "since emphatic and emotional fervor seemingly had prepared the
ground for nazism, every effort was made to suppress emotions and irrationality."
Lfidtke, supranote 30, at 550.
50.
For a discussion on the evolution and scope of the compensatory
policies instituted by the West German government, see id. at 562-70. The GDR
never recognized any responsibility for such war crimes or any need to make
restitution to the Jews until the fall of the GDR in 1989. See FULBROOK, supra
note 2, at 276.
51.
FULBROOK, supra note 2, at 303. This repression of the past by
Germans in the 1950s was also matched by a general political apathy on the part
of Germans. Id. at 304.
52.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, a collective repression of the
violent and murderous practices of the Nazi era persisted, such that "one's own

role and activity during fascism was 'forgotten' or 'cut out:' people silently erased
any remembrance of their own acceptance, support, and complicity." Lfidtke,
supra note 30, at 554.
53.
Extremist right-wing parties and organizations, including groups
formed by former SS and Hitler Youth members, garnered tens of thousands of
members during the postwar period. See LEWIS, supranote 11, at 40-41.

1994]

NEO-NAZISM IN GERMANY

909

in 1959.64 Public outcry prompted the West German government
to focus its efforts on education. 55 The authorities viewed the
desecrations as "deviant behavior" on the part of youngsters, and
concluded that educating the youth about Nazism would help
56
alleviate such right-wing extremism.
2. Education and Awareness
The West German government embarked on a plan to
increase awareness of anti-Semitism, racism, and the history of
Nazism. The plan included changes in both grade school and
adult education curricula.5 7 The government provided special
training to teachers and leaders of youth organizations, 5 8 and
funding for brochures and other teaching aides for classroom
lessons on the subject.5 9 Outside the classroom, by the mid1960s the government had created displays and restored certain
60
buildings at former concentration camps.
Notwithstanding these efforts, the government itself
encountered substantial difficulty in helping Germans confront

their Nazi past.

The West German government's efforts to

sponsor public commemorations and ceremonies were modest
and poorly publicized, in part because the government feared that
the emotions stirred by these events could cause the public to
react irrationally. 6 1 Consequently, these official actions were met
62
with public skepticism.
As an alternative to public ceremonies, formal education
proved to be a less incendiary and therefore more effective means
of coming to terms with Germany's Nazi history. The educational

54.
For example, members of a right-wing extremist youth group painted
swastikas on various Jewish cultural sites in the city of Cologne. Id. at 61.
Describing the reaction to the desecrations, one commentator noted:
55.
Politicians of all parties and journalists and commentators at national and

regional papers alike hastily proclaimed utter shame. Moral disgust was
made public over and over again. When it came to action, the publicists
and politicians joined forces to exert strong pressures on schools,
teachers, and publishers of textbooks for schools: nazism should not be
omitted but dealt with extensively.
Lidtke, supranote 30, at 552.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 553.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at 555-56.
61.
Id. at 555.
The government's activities were criticized for "gloss[ing] over the
62.
concrete suffering and grief of the mourners." Id. at 559.
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environment guaranteed "both orderly behavior and increased
rationality,"6 3 and did not incite the high emotions raised by
public events. Nevertheless, even the West German educational
policy on Nazism produced some unforeseeable consequences.
For example, a high school program designed to stimulate critical
thinking" resulted in the re-circulation of once influential antiSemitic writings. 65 Ironically, contrary to the express goals of
educating German youth about the horrors of Germany's Nazi
past, the educational policy apparently caused some young
Germans to support Nazi ideologies.
Concerned by such
developments, as recently as 1993 the German Federal Center for
Political Education banned a book entitled Hilter from use in
tenth-grade German classrooms. 6 6
After three years of
experimental use in two German states, the Center pulled the
book, citing fears that it might make neo-Nazis out of some of the
67
students.
Despite West Germany's attempt to confront its Nazi past, by
the 1980s certain incidents revealed "a startling ignorance of, or
set of misapprehensions about, the past on the part of many...

West Germans." 68

The reactions of the population to the

broadcast debut of the American television movie Holocaust
illustrates this general lack of knowledge. 69
The networks
prepared the Germans in the weeks before the air dates of
Holocaust by outlining the film and its story to the public through
preparatory broadcasts and press reviews, and by providing
information packages to schools.7 0 In addition, throughout the
broadcast, professional historians and survivors of the Holocaust
served as telephone panelists, answering questions from viewers
71
and offering opinions on both the film and German fascism.

63.
See id. at 555.
64.
Lfidtke, supra note 30, at 553. The program materials included
reprints and highlighted statements by several prominent, nineteenth-century,
pre-Nazi ideologues. Id.
65.
Id. The reading list included works and statements by Houston Stuart
Chamberlain, Count Gobineau, G-dnther Maar, Alfred St6cker, Richard Wagner,
and Alfred Rosenberg. Id.
66.
See Craig R. Whitney, German Schools Ban Books on Rise of Nazis, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al0.
67.
Id. Hitler depicts, through text and drawings, the torture of Jews and
political opponents of the Nazis in concentration camps, as well as the words of
Hitler, Goebbels, and other Nazi leaders. Id. One official at the Federal Center for
Political Education recognized the inclusion of such a book in the public school
curriculum as "an embarrassing mistake." Id.
68.
FULBROOK, supra note 2, at 306.
69.
Holocaust was a fictional depiction of the lives of a Jewish family in
Germany prior to and throughout World War II. Id.

70.

See Lfidtke, supra note 30, at 544.

71.

Id. at 545.
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The responses by the viewers revealed that many Germans were
previously unaware of the "'other' or 'silent' histories of the Nazi
past [that] existed outside academia and the schools." 7 2
C. Nationalismand Reunification
By the 1980s, West Germans openly and willingly adopted
the concept of Vergangenheitsbewdltigung (coming to terms with

the past).73 In fact, a new nationalism and German pride spread
across conservative comers of West Germany, symbolizing an end
to the guilt and shame of being German. 74 In 1989, the demise of
the Soviet Union enabled East Germany to end communist rule,
and the Berlin Wall, which symbolized the ideological barrier
between East and West Germany, was torn down.75 The rising
sense of nationalism in the West, including increased talk of the
traditional "fatherland,"76 facilitated reunification. On October 3,
77
1990, East and West Germany reunited as one nation.
Reunification had two distinct implications that advanced the
right-wing movement. First, the influx of sixteen million former
communists from the east who suddenly became new citizens and
voters in a democratic society7" gave Germany the opportunity to
develop a strong national and ethnic identity. 79 Second, since
Germany's borders opened after the fall of the Berlin Wall, over
one million foreigners have crossed into Germany seeking

72.
Id. at 547. Indeed, thousands phoned in, and "thousands cried on the
phone." Id. at 545-46. More than 20 million citizens, over 50% of the adult
population of the country, watched the film. More than one half of the survey's
respondents talked to relatives, friends, and colleagues about the film. Thus,
"non-viewers almost could not have avoided some information" pertaining to the
film. Id. at 545 n.10. On the whole matter of the broadcast and the responses,
see DER FERNSEHFILM "HOLOCAUST': EINE NATION IST BETROFEN (Peter
Marthesheimer & Ivo Frenzel eds., 1979); F.T. ERNSr, HOLOCAUS: Das
Fernschereignisaus der Sicht politischerBildung, AUS POLIK UND ZErEGESCHICHTE

34 (1981).
73.
74.
75.

See FULBROOK, supranote 2, at 304.
Id.
See Serge Schmemann, Clamour in the East; East Germany Opens

Frontierto the West for Migrationor Travel; Thousands Cross, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
1989, at Al; Serge Schmemann, Wall Opened at Old Center of Berlin, and Mayors
Meet,; Communists Call Congress; Square Is Mobbed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1989, at
Al.
76.
See FULBROOK, supranote 2, at 304.
77.
See Serge Schmemann, Evolution in Europe Two Germanys Unite After
45 Years with Jubilationand a Vow of Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990, at Al.
78.
See Muller, supranote 40, at 42-43.
79.
Id. at 43. For a general discussion of German identity, see Anne-Marie
Le Gloannec, On German Identity, DAEDALUS, Winter 1994, at 129. See also
FULBROOK, supranote 2, at 291-317.
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asylum.8 0 As a consequence of reunification, discontent has
fallen particularly over the eastern part of Germany, where the
millions of Germans left unemployed by the demise of socialism
have found themselves competing for jobs with over one million

asylum seekers. The modern rise of neo-Nazism may indeed be
attributed to the unification of people from two states that
espoused bipolar ideologies, coupled with a constant influx of
81
immigrants.

III.

MAGNITUDE OF THE

NEo-NAzI THREAT

A. Actions and Words
In August 1992, in the eastern German Baltic seaport of

Rostock, more than eight hundred young neo-Nazis launched an
armed attack on an apartment complex for refugees.8 2

The

eastern German youths, armed with Molotov cocktails, shotguns,
and clubs, shouted slogans such as "Sieg Heill" and "We demand

a New Ffirher."8 3 They were lashing out at foreigners, whom they
blamed for Germany's high unemployment rate and recessed

economy. 84 The neo-Nazis sent a clear message of dissatisfaction
with Germany's immigration policies, compelling the German
government to announce policy changes favored by neo-Nazis. 8 5

80.
See Craig R. Whitney, A Shadow in Germany: A Special Report, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, atAl. After the fall of the Berlin Wall:
[tjhe euphoria of freeing East Germany from its Communist shackles
evaporated quickly, to be replaced by uncertainty, resentment and bitter
reality. The costs of rebuilding the decrepit east are staggering-estimates
ran as high as $610 billion-and this normally prosperous nation... is
now coping with increased unemployment-7% in western Germany, 14%
in the east-and a worrisome recession.

Tamara Jones, Germany's Troubles, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, (Magazine), at 14.
81.
See Heiner Mfiller, Germany's Identity Crisis, NEW PERSP. Q., Winter
1993, at 16. The demise of socialism, coupled with German unification, created a
vacuum in Germany where capitalism no longer had an enemy. In short, "[i]n the
wake of the discrediting of the left-wing ideologies, right wing extremism has
simply assumed the role of capitalism's harshest critic." Id.
82.
See Marlin A. Lee, Hitler's Offspring, THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 1993, at
30. The apartment complex housed more than 100 asylum-seekers from Vietnam
and other countries. See also Stephen Kinzer, Germans Sentence Anti.Foreign
Rioter to 2 1/2 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at A15 [hereinafter Germans
Sentence Anti-ForeignRioterj.
83.
See Lee, supranote 82, at 30.
84.
See Jones, supra note 80, at 14.
85.
Shortly after the Rostock attack, German officials called for the
immediate repeal of the German constitutional guarantee of asylum for political
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In response to this apparent victory, these extremists staged a
series of rallies leading to further attacks in Rostock and
throughout Germany. 86
The violence was not limited to
foreigners; the attacks were also aimed at Jews and represented a
broader sentiment of racism and hatred. 7 In August 1992 and
the months that followed, the neo-Nazi movement demonstrated
its resources, resolve, and destructive force.8 8
For example,
several dozen policemen were injured in the original Rostock
attack.89
Incidents of anti-Jewish violence, in particular,
increased in Germany from sixty-five in 1992 to seventy-two in
1993. 9 0 The number of anti-Jewish incidents, including the
defacing of Jewish synagogues, cemeteries, and community
centers, also rose from 562 in 1992 to 656 in 1993.91
German neo-Nazis pose a very real, physical threat because
they are well-fortified with an impressive arsenal of weaponry. In
addition to the more easily obtainable generic weapons, such as
the shotguns and Molotov cocktails used in the attack in Rostock,
neo-Nazis have stockpiled state-of-the-art munitions by raiding
the military installations of the former Red Army in eastern
Germany. 92 In fact, neo-Nazis reportedly have purchased rocket
launchers and other high-tech arms directly from withdrawing
93
Russian soldiers.
Since the end of the Second World War, the German
government has viewed neo-Nazi violence as a "minor nuisance,"

refugees and ordered the deportation of nearly 100,000 Gypsies to Romania. See

Lee, supranote 82, at 30.
86.

Cf. John Eisenhammer, Racist Viwlence Sweeps Over Germany in

Rostock's Wake, THE INDEPENDEr, Aug. 31, 1992, at 8. In Eisenhfittenstadt, for
example, a foreigner's hostel was gutted by a petrol-bomb attack. In Zielitz, 40
neo-Nazi youths bombed another hostel, severely burning two residents. In
Leipzig, a refugee tent encampment was obliterated by petrol-bombs. Id.
87.
"The [neo-]Nazis sparked a wave of terror unlike anything Germany
has witnessed since Hitler was in power. [Neo-]Nazi thugs went on a rampage,
attacking foreigners in hundreds of cities and towns. Jewish cemeteries were
desecrated with swastikas, and a memorial to a concentration camp was gutted
by arsonists." Lee, supra note 82, at 30. Attacks on Jewish cemeteries had
increased from 62 in 1992 to 67 in 1993. See Anna Tomforde, Neo-Nazi Hate
Shifts from Turks to Jews, THE GUARDIAN, May 28, 1994, at 13.
88.
"[E]very weekend still brings new assaults on refugees." Marc Fisher,
Rightists' Attacks on ForeignersEbbing in Germany, WASH. POSr, Mar. 5, 1993, at
A23. The number of attacks against foreigners had decreased by March 1993.
Id.
89.
See Ian Murray, Police Battle Racist Mob in Fifth Night of Rostock Riots,
THE TIMES (London), Aug. 27, 1992.
90.
See Tomforde, supra note 87, at 13.
91.
Id.
92.
See Lee, supranote 82, at 30.
93.
Id.
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instigated by a "lunatic fringe composed of deranged misfits and
malcontents." 94 However, the recent rise in Neo-Nazis violence 9
has impressed upon the German government

that right-wing

extremism is now much more than a mere nuisance 9 6 and has
compelled the government to act accordingly. In fact, Germany's
federal intelligence service recently tripled the size of the
department responsible for the surveillance of right-wing
97
militants.
For many of those living in Germany, especially foreigners
seeking asylum, fears of violence are compounded by the fact that
the German police appear apathetic, and in some cases
sympathetic, toward the neo-Nazi cause. 9 8 The police do not
rigidly enforce provisions outlawing slogans such as "Sieg Heill" 99
In the Rostock attack, the police were accused of standing idle
while the neo-Nazis wreaked havoc. 10 0 Most significantly, the
police actually participated in the attacks on foreigners in the
towns of Dresden and Eisenhfittenstadt. In Eisenhfittenstadt, the
attacks by
the police continued even after the neo-Nazis left the
1
scene.

10

The neo-Nazis can be recognized as much by their words as
by their violent actions. A popular rallying cry among neo-Nazis
is to deny or cast into doubt the historical fact of the Holocaust.
This theory, known as the "Auschwitz Lie," denies that the Nazis
orchestrated the systematic extermination of Jews. Neo-Nazis
contend that the Allies and Jews deliberately lied in reports of
94.
Id. at31.
95.
In 1990, 375 acts of violence by right-wing extremists were recorded
by the German government's Office for the Protection of the Constitution. In
1991, 1,483 acts of violence were recorded. In 1992, the number rose to 2,285
recorded acts of violence. See Jones, supra note 80, at 14. By comparison, only
388 acts of violence were documented between 1983 and 1987. LEWIS, supra
note 11, at 126 (setting forth these statistics at tbl. 5.3).
96.
Writing in the Christian Science Monitor in February 1993, a German
cabinet minister noted the "destructive potential" of right-wing radicals, and
stated that the violent threats of these groups are taken "very seriously by the
government See Friedrich Bohl, Germans Move to Stem Violence, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 9, 1993, at 18.
97.
See Whitney, supranote 80, at Al.
98.
The Republican Party, on the right of the German political spectrum
and the party that many neo-Nazis support in elections, has a higher proportion
of supporters among police than the general electorate, which may explain the

reluctance of the police to crack down on neo-Nazi groups. Lee, supra note 82, at
31.
99.
See id. "Unless they are physically assaulted by Nazi groups... the
police are apt to turn a blind eye as [these groups] parade through the streets...
.0 Id. For a discussion of the applicable laws prohibiting such slogans, see infra
part IV.
100.
See Kinzer, Germans Sentence Anti-Foreign Rioter, supra note 82, at
A15.
101.
See Lee, supranote 82, at 31.
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such events in order to discredit Germany.1° 2 For example, many
neo-Nazis espousing the Auschwitz Lie claim that reports

documenting the number of Jews killed in Nazi death camps were

greatly exaggerated. 1

3

Others claim that the Holocaust took

place without Hitler's knowledge.1 ° 4 Most proponents of the
Auschwitz Lie, however, deny the existence of the Nazi death
camps and gas chambers altogether.1 0 5 Neo-Nazis propagate the
Auschwitz Lie
through a vast
array of media and
communications, including books, videos, brochures, and
speeches.10o
B. Organization
Active right-wing extremists account for approximately
42,500 of Germany's present population. 1°0 Many are affiliated
with known and established political or militant organizations,
and many others are affiliated with political organizations that are
banned by the government and remain underground.1 0 8 As a
purely political threat, the total number of people in the extremist
groups is minimal compared to the total population of
Germany. 10 Nevertheless, these groups have caused substantial
destruction throughout Germany and influenced German

102.
Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against
the 'Auschwitz" and Other 'Lies," 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 280 (1986).
See
discussion suprapart IV.A.2.
103.
Holocaust Denial Not Covered by Free Speech, Press Association
Newsfile, April 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.

104.

Id.

105.
See Stein, supranote 102, at 280 n.11.
106.
See id. at 280.
107.
See Jones, supranote 80, at 14. The New York Times recently reported
the number of right-wing extremists to be approximately 41,900. See Whitney,
supra note 80, at Al. Significantly, the reunification with East Germany has
provided a receptive mass constituency to expand the ranks of neo-Nazi parties,
who deftly exploit the economic troubles and social hardship in eastem Germany.
Lee, supranote 82, at 29.
108.
See LEWIS, supra note 11, at 6-8.
For example, the National
Democratic Party (NDP) is an extreme right-wing political party on the fringe of
legality in Germany. Id. The neo-Nazi group Nationalist Front,' on the other hand,
was banned by the government in November 1992. See Kinzer, Germans Sentence
Anti-Foreign Rioter, supra note 82, at A15. The federal intelligence service has
reported that 82 right-wing extremist organizations and other groupings existed
in 1992 in Germany. In 1991, there were only 76 of these groups. Whitney,
supranote 80, at Al.
109.
LEWIS, supranote 11, at 8. Roughly 80 million people currently live in
Germany. See Jones, supra note 80, at 14.

916

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:899

policy. 110 Moreover, neo-Nazis have begun to cooperate with
accepted, albeit far right-wing, political parties such as Germany's
Republican Party.1 11

The organizational structure of the right-wing extremists is
informal, yet strong. The groups are in close, constant contact
with one another through the efforts of Die Bewegung (The
Movement), which is controlled by a "well organized network of
neo-Nazi stalwarts." 112 The leaders of Die Bewegung, who know
that the German government continuously monitors their
activities, operate through a "diffuse array of front groups and
113
factions, with different names in every region of the country."
In an effort to spread their message and evade the German
authorities, neo-Nazis have become increasingly sophisticated in
their use of computer networks and other high-technology
devices. 114 In addition, neo-Nazi leaders escape governmental
monitoring by using computers with encoded software and private
mailboxes on an international network. This computer network
effectively operates as a black market where neo-Nazis can trade
various articles of propaganda, including banned copies of Hilter's
speeches and books denying the existence of the Holocaust. 115
Journalists who have infiltrated the neo-Nazi groups report that
neo-Nazis are better coordinated and organized than the
authorities anticipated, and that the German government has
1 16
underestimated the depth and power of the movement.

110. The Rostock attacks and riots exemplify the breadth of the right-wing
extremists' power. See supratext accompanying notes 79-85 for a discussion of
the Rostock incident.
111. Lee, supra note 82, at 31. The Republican Party, whose leader is a
former SS member named Franz Schonhuber, is the foremost nationalist party in
Germany, with approximately 25,000 members. Whitney, supra note 80, at Al.
In August 1994, Germany's interior minister ordered the Republican Party placed
under surveillance by federal security agents and labeled "extremist." The action

was taken after Schonhuber announced an alliance with the German People's
Union, a fellow ultra-nationalist political party, already deemed unconstitutional
by the German government. See Rick Atkinson, Bonn Orders Close Watch On FarRight Nationalists,INTM HERALD TRIB., August 24, 1994.
112. Lee, supranote 82, at 29.
113. Id.
114. See Elizabeth Neuffer, Neo-Nazi Spreading Hate utith High-Tech,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 1994, at 1. Computer networks, cellular phones, and
fax machines have enabled the neo-Nazis to reach a greater audience across
Europe, where they garner both ideological and financial support. Id.
115. Id. In April 1994, "large quantities" of neo-Nazi literature denying the

existence of the Holocaust were reported to have been filed into Internet, the
world's largest computer network. TV Says Neo-Nazi PropagandaUploaded Into
Internet, Reuters World Service, April 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Non-US File.
116. Whitney, supra note 80, at Al.
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IV. GERMAN LAW
A. Individual Liberties Guaranteedby the Basic Law

1. Overview
The Basic Law represents the primary legal attempt of the
West German government to combat the resurgence of Nazism.
The Basic Law, originally intended as a temporary constitution
pending reunification with East Germany," l7 established a
"militant democracy" in West Germany." 8 This constitutional
scheme places a value on the dignity of man and restricts those
who attempt to undermine that dignity." 9 Thus, it "does not
grant any liberties to the enemies of liberty." 120 For example,
while Article 21, Section 1 states that political parties may be
freely established, 12 1 Section 2 empowers
the Federal
Constitutional Court to eliminate those parties that seek to impair
122
or abolish the free democratic basic order.

117. Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council of West Germany on May
23, 1949, the Basic Law was actually designed to be the temporary law of the
land, pending reunification with East Germany and subsequent adoption of a
"permanent," formal constitution. See FULBROOK, supranote 2, at 163.
The temporary nature of the Basic Law is best illustrated by an examination of
its own language. For example, the Preamble of the Basic Law resolves "to give a
new order to political life for a transitional period." GG pmbl., Karpen at 226.
(emphasis added). Further, the final article of the Basic Law provides that the
"Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the day which a constitution adopted by a
free decision of the German people comes into force." GG art. 146, Karpen at
306. Finally, Article 116 defines "German" to encompass persons living in the
German Democratic Republic. Id. at 116, Karpen at 296.
118. See Donald P. Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the
United States and the FederalRepublic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 674
(1980). A militant democracy ensures that "the state has the right, if not the
duty, to defend itself by suppressing anticonstitutional activities. The state is not
helpless and need not constitutionally observe a stoical silence even in the face of
verbal assaults on its constitutional structure." Id. at 680.
119. Professor Andreas Heldrich of the University of Munich agreed with the
following characterization of the underlying principle of the militant democracy by
Professor Heldrich's interviewer, Robert Siegel: "Militant democracy says there
are people who are undemocratic and it's our duty not to protect their right to be
undemocratic." All Things Considered(NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 3, 1992).
120. Gfinter DOirig, An Introduction to the Basic Law of the FederalRepublic
of Germany, in THE CONSII'MON OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 11, 16
(ULrich Karpen ed., 1988).
121. GG art. 21(1), Karpen at 236.
122. Id. This section provides:
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The individual liberties guaranteed by the Basic Law are not
absolute even though Article 1, Section 1 of the Basic Law

proclaims:

"The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect

and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority." 123 The
Federal Constitutional Court 124 has described this "dignity of
12 5
man" as the "center of all [the Basic Law's] determinations."
However, the individual liberties guaranteed in the Basic Law may
be limited by "general laws"126 and by "the right to inviolability of
personal honor."1 2 7 A general law satisfies two requirements: (1)
the law must be content neutral, meaning it must regulate
matters rather than ideas; and (2) the law may only limit
individual liberty if the purpose of the law has a higher rank of
importance than the individual liberty itself.12 8 Article 2 of the
Basic Law is even more explicit in recognizing the extent to which
individual rights may be limited. Article 2 provides: "Everyone
shall have the right to the free development of his personality in
so far as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against
the constitutional order or the moral code." 12 9
The Basic Law has been construed to govern the relationship
between the individual and the state as well as relationships
between individuals. The Basic Law confers both "subjective" and
"objective" fundamental rights upon individuals. Fundamental
constitutional rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of
association may be claimed by an individual directly against the
state. These rights are subjective or defensive rights, binding on

Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their
adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to

endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be
unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall decide on the
question of unconstitutionality.

Id.
123. Id. art. 1(1), Karpen at 227.
124. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany is the highest court in
the land and acts as the guardian of the Basic Law, interpreting it to ensure
uniformity and consistency throughout Germany. This court is the ultimate
protector of basic rights. See FOSIER, supra note 4, at 44-45.
125.

Judgment

of

February

25,

1975,

39

Entscheidungen

des

Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court]
[BVerfGE] 1, 67 (F.R.G.).
126. Article 5(2) provides: "These rights are limited by the provisions of the

general laws .... " GG art. 5(2), Karpen at 228. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing
how the Penal Code may limit individual liberties).

127.

Id.

128. Ulrich Karpen, Freedom of Speech, in THE CONSTrIUION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 91, 97 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988). Valid general laws
include, for instance, laws protecting individual honor and personality, as well as

laws protecting youth. Id. See also GG art. 5(2), Karpen at 228.
129. Id. art. 2(1), Karpen at 227 (emphasis added).
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In contrast,
all branches of government and state actors. 13
objective rights are general protections afforded by the Basic Law.
The objective rights attempt to ensure that the subjective rights
may be realized by the individual, without interference by the
government, by encouraging the state to create a safe
environment in which individuals may exercise their subjective
rights. 13 1 Therefore, while the Basic Law generally involves the
relationship between the individual and the state, the Federal
Constitutional Court has established that the Basic Law applies
to relationships between individuals through the objective
rights. 132
Although the Basic Law is the supreme law of the land,
German constitutional interpretation is grounded in the "ordinary
law" of the German Civil Code (Civil Code), similar to the
grounding of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence in the common
law. 133 The Civil Code is still the primary source of private law
between individuals in Germany. 13 The underlying philosophy of
the Civil Code is freedom of the individual, expressed as the
autonomy of the will. 13 5 Thus, individuals seeking to protect their

freedom of expression turn first to the doctrines of the ordinary
law found in the Civil Code before looking to the Basic Law for
protection. 136

2. Freedom of Expression
The bedrock democratic principle of freedom of expression
forms the foundation of the Basic Law. Article 5, Section 1
specifically guarantees the freedoms of speech, press, reporting,
and informing oneself.1 3 7 In part, these freedoms represent an

130. Helmut Goerlich, Fundamental ConstitutionalRights: Content, Meaning
and General Doctrines, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
45, 50 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988). See also Kommers, supranote 118, at 675.

Article 1(3) states that the basic rights "shall bind the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law." GG art. 1(3), Karpen at

227.
131.

See Kommers, supra note 118, at 676. For a further discussion on

subjective and objective rights, see FOSTER, supranote 4, at 115-16.
7 BVerfGE at 205.
132.
133.
See Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in

German

ConstitutionalTheory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 251 (1989).
134.
See FOSTER, supranote 4, at 193. The German Civil Code (Bfirgerliches
Gesetzbuch) became effective on January 1, 1900, and remains the basis for

German law today. See id.
135. See FOSIER, supranote 4, at 22.
136. Quint, Free Speech, supranote 133, at 251.
137. Article 5(1) provides:
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attempt by the government of West Germany to ensure that the
evils of Nazism remain in the past. For example, the freedom to
inform oneself from generally accessible sources is designed to
prevent the resurgence of a Hilterian dictatorship, which existed
aeven over minds." 138 Moreover, the freedom of speech provides a
"barrier against an overweight of government propaganda," that
may potentially sweep "over the people under an alleged 'duty of

the democratic state." 139 Nevertheless, the freedom of expression
guaranteed in the Basic Law is not without limits.
The
prohibitions against violating the rights of others and offending
the constitutional order or the moral code may limit freedom of
expression. 14° Article 18 reads: "Whoever abuses freedom of
expression... in order to combat the free democratic basic order,
shall forfeit these basic rights."14 1 Thus, the scope of the
limitation on free speech hinges upon the extent to which the
speech threatens the "free democratic basic order," a concept that
generally means "the liberal democracy consciously created,
promoted, and protected by express provisions of the Basic
142
Law."
The German courts have addressed the tension between the
guarantees of the Basic Law and limitations found in other
sources of law or in the Basic Law itself. In the L72th case, 143 the
Federal Constitutional Court confronted the issue of whether the
general laws of the Civil Code supersede the freedom of
expression guaranteed by the Basic Law. Lfth, an official in the
Hamburg government acting in a private capacity, proposed a
boycott of the film Immortal Lover, because the notorious antiSemite and Nazi Era propagandist, Veit Harlan, directed the
film. 14 4

Harlan sought an injunction prohibiting Lfith from

Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion
by speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally
accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by

means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed.
censorship.

There shall be no

GG art. 5(1), Karpen at 228.
138.
Karpen, supra note 128, at 94 (citing THEODOR MAUNZ-REINHOLD
ZIPPEUUS, DEUTSCHES STAATSREcin 180 (24th ed. 1982)).

139.

Id. at 94.

140.

See GG art. 2(1), Karpen at 227.

141. Id. art. 18, Karpen at 234.
142. Kommers, supranote 118, at 680. For a more specific definition of the
concept of "free democratic basic order," including the criteria designed by the
Federal Constitutional Court to be its essential components, see Karl Doehring,
The Special Characterof the Constitution of the FederalRepublic of Germany as a
Free Democratic Basic Order, in THE CONsnmuION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 25, 27 (ULrich Karpen ed., 1988).
143. LMith case, Judgment of January 15, 1958, 7 BVerfGE 198.
144. Id. at 199-200.
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calling for the boycott.'" Relying upon Section 826 of the Civil
Code, Harlan claimed that Lth's conduct intentionally inflicted
economic injury upon him "in a manner contrary to public
policy." 1 6
In response, Lith claimed that a court-ordered
injunction would violate his freedom of expression guaranteed
14 7
under Article 5 of the Basic Law.
The court recognized that the rights of free speech are
"absolutely fundamental." 14 Thus, while the general laws may
limit free speech, these laws must be read in light of the
constitutional provision upholding this most basic right. 14 9 The
court concluded that this "reciprocal effect"1 5 0 between the basic
rights and the general laws 1 5 ' requires it to weigh the values of
the general law against the values of the Basic Law under the
circumstances of each case. 152
The Federal Constitutional Court applied this balancing
approach, holding that Lfith was entitled to proceed with his call
for a boycott. In examining the particular circumstances of the
case, the court considered Lfith's motive in seeking the boycott,
recognizing that he would not benefit financially from a successful
boycott.'5
Rather, L-Uth's speech was intended to prevent the
rest of the world from thinking that Germans had not fully
repudiated their Nazi past.lM
Upon examining the underlying
motives and implications of the speech itself, the court noted that
Lfith's proposal for a boycott of Harlan's film was consistent with
the principles of the Basic Law and democracy.155 Consequently,
Harlan's opposing private and purely economic interests, which
were protected under the general law of the Civil Code, 15 6 had a
minimal effect on the court's decision. The court concluded that
LWith's interest in freedom of expression outweighed the private
economic interests professed by Harlan. 15 7

145.

Id.

146.

BORGERLICHES GESETBUCH [Civil Code] [BGB], art. 826 (F.R.G.).

147.

7 BVerfGE at 200.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 208.
Id. at 208-209.
Id.
GG art. 5(1)-(2).
7 BVerfGE at 2 10-11. According to the court, this balancing approach

is necessary because the rights under Article 5, Section 1 of the Basic Law are
limited by the general laws under Article 5, Section 2 which are, in turn,
influenced by the basic rights (reciprocal effect). Id. See also Quint, Free Speech,
supra note 133, at 283-84.

153.
154.
155.
156.

7 BVerfGE at 215-216.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 216-17.
BGB art 826.

157.

See Quint, Free Speech, supra note 133, at 286.
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The Mephisto case,158 decided by the Federal Constitutional
Court in 1971, contrasts sharply with the Lftth court's strong
assertion of the constitutional right to freedom of expression.1 5 9

The Mephisto holding suggests that the Basic Law guarantees of
freedom of expression 160 and artistic freedom1 6 1 are not inviolate,
and that under certain circumstances they must yield to
countervailing interests. In Mephisto, the heir of a deceased
German actor sought to enjoin the publication of a novel allegedly
based on the actor's life. 16 2 The Mephisto court found that the
novel was a work of art and, therefore, was protected not by the
Basic Law right to free expression, but rather by the Basic Law
guarantee of artistic freedom. 16 The Mephisto court clarified a
significant distinction between these two Basic Law provisions.
Whereas the right to freedom of expression may be limited by
either general law provisions or by the Basic Law itself, the
guarantee of artistic freedom may be limited only by
countervailing Basic Law provisions.1 64 The Mephisto court found
such countervailing provisions in the Basic Law's protection of
1 66
personality1 6 s and human dignity.
The court determined that because truth and fiction were so
intertwined in the novel, the fictional accounts would have
defamed the memory of the deceased actor. 167 Therefore, the
court held that the actor's interest in personality and human
dignity outweighed the writer's interest in free artistic expression,
and it enjoined publication of the novel.1 6 8 Thus, Mephisto
suggests that "the interest in free expression is not significantly
weightier than any other constitutional interest." 16 9 Indeed, the
subsequent decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in

158.
159.
160.

Judgment of February 9, 1971, 30 BVerfGE 173.
Quint, Free Speech, supranote 133, at 290.
GG art. 5(1), Karpen at 228.

161. Article 5, Section 3 provides, in relevant part, "Art and science . . .
shall be free." GG art. 5(3), Karpen at 228.
162.

Quint, Free Speech, supranote 133, at 291.

163. Id. at 292-93
164. Id. at 296. In practice, the Mephisto court's distinction between a
general law provision and a Basic Law guarantee may be irrelevant. Often a
general law protects an important personal interest that is simultaneously
protected by a Basic Law guarantee. Id. Therefore, an infringement of such a
general law may implicate a Basic Law interest, such as human dignity, the
protection of which may outweigh other conflicting Basic Law guarantees, such as
artistic freedom or freedom of expression. Id.
165. GG art. 2(1), Karpen at 227. For the full text of this provision, see
supratext accompanying note 129.
166.
167.
168.

GG art. 1(1), Karpen at 227.
30 BVerfGE at 195.
See Quint, Free Speech, supra note 133, at 295.

169.

Id. at 307.
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Lebach1 70 solidified this conclusion by granting a preliminary
injunction preventing the showing of a teleplay.1 7 1 The court

weighed the values of freedom of reporting1 72 against an
individual's right to personality17 3 and again ruled in favor of the
individual's right to personality.1 74
In sum, the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 5 of
the Basic Law is not absolute. Freedom of expression may be
limited by general laws under the Civil Code or balanced in light
of all of the circumstances against other fundamental rights
protected by the Basic Law.
3. Political Parties
The general provision of Article 21 of the Basic Law maintains
that "political parties shall participate in the forming of the
political will of the people. They may be freely established." 175
76
However, consistent with the concept of a militant democracy,1
Germany will not tolerate enemies of its democratic structure and
Basic Law. When Germany promulgated the Basic Law, it sought
to eradicate Nazism and disassociate itself from any political party
espousing goals and values the same as, or similar to, those of
the Nazi Party. Therefore, the German Basic Law explicitly
outlaws political parties whose central beliefs are contrary to the
77
current constitutional system-the free democratic basic order.1

170.
171.

Judgment of June 5, 1974, 35 BVerfGE 202.
See Kommers, supra note 118, at 691. Lebach, decided in 1973,

involved a television documentary depicting a series of murders that occurred in
Germany in 1969. When one of the perpetrators was scheduled for parole in
1973, he sought to enjoin the broadcast because it identified him by name,
making him fear for his safety. Id.
172.
See GG art. 5(1), Karpen at 228. This section provides, in full:
Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his
opinion by speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform himself from
generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of
reportingby means of broadcastsand films are guaranteed. There shall be
no censorship.
Id. (emphasis added).
173.
GG art. 2(1) provides: "Everyone shall have the right to the free
development of his personality in so far as he does not violate the rights of others
or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code." GG art. 2(1), Karpen
at 227 (emphasis added).
174.
35 BVerfGE at 225.
175.
GG art. 21(1), Karpen at 236.
176.
See supranotes 118-19 and accompanying text
177. Article 21(2) provides:
Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their
adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to
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For example, within the first seven years of the formation of West
Germany, two political parties were banned by the Federal
Constitutional Court 1 7 8-the Socialist Reich Party in 1952,179 and
the Communist Party of Germany in 1956.180 The court held that
"it is fundamentally inconsistent to allow parties to function in a
constitutional system that presupposes basic values rejected by
5
those parties."' '
Article 9 of the German Basic Law provides the more general
guarantee of freedom of association. 182 Nevertheless, even this
Article prohibits associations or societies whose purposes or
activities conflict with criminal laws or are directed against the
basic constitutional order.183 However, Article 9 does not restrict
political groups, which are specifically addressed in Article 2 1.184
B. Statutory Restrictionson Individual Liberties:
The German Penal Code
The German Penal Code (Penal Code)1 8 5 is another tool that
the German government may use to combat the resurgence of
Nazism. The Penal Code was amended in 1975 to include
revisions that had occurred in the formative years of West
Germany, beginning in 1952.186 The Penal Code, in its current
form, was enacted in 1987.187 The Penal Code represents one set
endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be
unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall decide on the
question of unconstitutionality.
GG art. 21(2), Karpen at 236 (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the components of a free democratic basic order, see
Doehring, supranote 142, at 27.
178. See FOSTER, supra note 4, at 111. Political parties may only be
prohibited by the Federal Constitutional Court. GG art. 21(2).
179. Judgment of October 23, 1952, 2 BVerfGE 1.
180. Judgment of August 17, 1956, 5 BVerfGE 85.

181.

Quint, Free Speech, supranote 133, at 262 n.54.

182. GG art. 9(1), Karpen at 229. Article 9, Section (1), explicitly states:
"All Germans shall have the right to form associations and societies." Id.
183. Article 9(2) provides: "Associations, the purposes or activities of which
conflict with criminal laws or which are directed against the constitutional order
or the concept of international understanding, are prohibited." GG art. 9(2),
Karpen at 229.
184. FOSTER, supranote 4, at 122; see supranote 122.
185. Strafgesetzbuch [Penal Code] [StGB], translatedin THE PENAL CODE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Joseph J. Darby trans., 1987) [hereinafter
Darby].
186. See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Introduction to THE PENAL CODE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1, 4 (Joseph J. Darby trans., 1987).
187. See FOSTER, supranote 4, at 167. This version of the Code remains in
place even after the reunification of East and West Germany. Upon reunification,
the German Penal Code applied to the former East Germany as well, with few
changes. See id.
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of general laws that may limit the individual freedoms guaranteed
by the Basic Law.18 8
1. Criminal Agitation
The offense of criminal agitation set forth in Article 130 of the
Penal Code primarily focuses on "safeguarding public peace." 18 9
This provision proscribes conduct against human dignity likely to
breach the public peace by arousing hatred among segments of
the population; instigating violence or arbitrary acts; or insulting,
ridiculing, or defaming segments of the population.1 9 0 An attack
against human dignity exists only if "it is directed against the
unrenounceable and nonincidental core of a personality of
another, against him as a human being, and only if it denies his
value." 19 1 The penalty for this crime is imprisonment for six
months to five years. 192
2. Representation of Violence and Incitement to Racial Hatred
Article 131 of the Penal Code also provides for the protection
of public peace. 193 In addition, Article 131 explicitly proscribes
any writing or broadcast that incites racial hatred or "depicts
cruel or otherwise inhumane acts of violence against persons in
such a manner as to glorify or deny the wrongfulness of such
acts." 194 However, it exempts historical reports and current

188.
189.
190.

Stein, supranote 102, at 279. See also discussion suprapart IV.A.2.
Stein, supranote 102, at 283.
StGB art. 130, Darby at 140. The full text provides:

Whoever in a manner likely to disturb the public peace, attacks
human dignity by:
1.
arousing hatred against segments of the population;

2.

fomenting arbitrary or violent action against them; or

3.

by insulting, maliciously degrading or defaming them,

shall be punished by imprisonment from six months to five years.
Id
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 292 (quoting 1981 NStZ 258).
StGB art. 130, Darby at 140.
See Stein, supranote 102, at 285.

194.

Article 131 states, in pertinent part:

(1)

Whoever
1.
distributes;

2.
makes accessible; ...

publicly displays, posts up, presents or otherwise
any writings which incite to racial hatred or which

depict cruel or otherwise inhumane acts of violence against persons in
such a manner as to glorify or deny the wrongfulness of such acts of
violence, or which represent the cruel or inhumane aspects of the subject
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events from its coverage. 195 This provision was aimed primarily
at the incitement of racial hatred against Jews.1 9 6 A violation of
Article 131 carries the penalty of imprisonment for up to one year
or a fine, a substantially lower penalty than that imposed by
197
Article 130 for criminal agitation.
3. Insult and Formal Complaints

Until 1985, the crime of "insult" under Article 185 of the
Penal Code 19 8 only applied to individuals in private matters. Prior
to its amendment, a private petition was required to bring an
action for insult.19 9 This private petition requirement often left
such conduct unpunished because many insults, such as denying
the existence of the Holocaust, are not directed at particular
individuals.
In 1985 the government revised the provision in the Penal
Code defining who may bring a petition for insult.2 0°
As
amended, the private petition requirement may be waived if (1)
the crime of insult was committed through a writing or broadcast;
(2) the victim suffered persecution under the National Socialists
or any other form of tyranny; and (3) the persecuted group is part
of the German population. 20
By making it possible for the
government to prosecute the crime of insult, the government has
facilitated actions against neo-Nazis for insulting Jews.
In
particular, the amended provision has "relieve[d] the offended
party from the burden of proof, including the showing that he is a
2
Jew.
Article 194(2) of the Penal Code criminalizes the act of
defaming the memory of a deceased person. 20 3 This provision,

matter in a manner violative of human dignity, shall be punished by
imprisonment for up to one year or by fine.
StGB art. 131, Darby at 141.
195.
196.

StGB art. 131(3), Darby at 141.
See Stein, supranote 102, at 285-86.

197.

StGB art. 13 1(1), Darby at 141.

198.
provides:

StGB art. 185, Darby at 141. Article 185 of the German Penal Code
"An insult shall be punished by up to one year's imprisonment or by

fine and, if the insult is committed by means of violence, by up to two years'
imprisonment or by fine." Id.
199. See Stein, supranote 102, at 312.
200. I. at 305-12.
201. StGB art. 194(1), Darby at 170-71.
202. Stein, supranote 102, at 315.
203. StGB art. 194(2), Darby at 171. This section provides, "If the memory
of a deceased person is blackened, the surviving relatives... shall be entitled to
fie a formal complaint." Id.
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which allows the relative of the deceased to file a complaint, could
2 °4
be used to combat neo-Nazi hate speech and propaganda.
4. Genocide
Finally, in a direct attempt by the West German government
to eradicate the vestiges of Nazism, Article 220a of the Penal Code
explicitly criminalizes genocide. 20
This provision criminalizes
many of the evils of the Nazi era including murder, infliction of
injury, subjection to living conditions likely to cause death,
eugenics, and forcible child transfers from one group to another.
This Article provides for a maximum sentence of life in prison 2°
20 7
and a minimum sentence of five years in prison.
C. Implicationsfor Individual Liberties
The Basic Law provides the primary means by which the
German government may restrict the expression of neo-Nazis. In
applying the Basic Law in free speech cases, the Federal Constitutional Court may balance the social value of the speech against
the value of freedom of expression itself.20 8 If the court determines that under the totality of the circumstances the speech
threatens the free democratic basic order in Germany, then the
court may prohibit that speech. Alternatively, the Federal Constitutional Court may weigh the value of free speech against the
value of the dignity of man and personality, the most fundamental
of all basic rights.0 9 Certain types of speech-especially speech
offensive to Jews-may be prohibited if the damage to the dignity

204.

See id.

205.

StGB art. 220a, Darby at 182.

206.

Article 220a(1) states:

Whoever, with the intention of wholly or partially destroying a national,

racial, religious or ethnically distinct group as such,
1.
kills a member of a group;
2.
a group;
3.

inflicts serious physical or mental injury... on members of
subjects the group to living conditions likely to cause death

to all or some of the members;
4.
imposes measures designed to prevent births within the
group;
5.
forcibly transfers children from one group to another,
shall be punished by imprisonment for life.
StGB art. 220a(1), Darby at 182.
207. StGB art. 220a(2), Darby at 182.
208. See supratext accompanying notes 153-57.
209. See supratext accompanying notes 158-66.
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of those subjected to the speech outweighs the value of the speech

itself.
Germany has relied on the Basic Law2 1 0 to ban certain
2 11
political parties that contradict its free democratic basic order.
By outlawing such parties, the German government seeks to
ensure that neo-Nazi groups do not sponsor candidates in state
elections. The government banned at least seven right-wing
extremist groups in the 1980s, 21 2 and at least one group as
recently as 1992.213
In addition to the Basic Law, Germany's criminal law vests its
courts with broad discretion to restrict neo-Nazi speech. For
example, German courts have imposed penalties for using banned
2 14
Nazi symbols such as the swastika and the "Heil Hitlerl" salute.
Under the rubric of insult and inciting racial hatred, the swastika
and "Heil Hitlerl" salute remain illegal in Germany today.
However, neo-Nazis have circumvented the laws prohibiting the
"Heil Hitler!" salute by raising their arms and extending three
fingers rather than five fingers, or by raising their arms and
spreading two fingers to indicate "victory."2 15 In fact, one German
judge released a man for this variation. 2 16 Likewise, neo-Nazis
have altered the swastika-the infamous symbol of the Nazi party
noted for its prominent right angles and criss-cross shape-into a
stylized and rounded, yet clearly recognizable, shape.
The
German government responded to the neo-Nazis prolific usage of
altered Nazi symbols by enacting further legislation specifically
criminalizing such variations.
In September 1994, the
government extended its ban on Nazi symbols and slogans to

include anything that might even resemble such symbols and
2 17

slogans.
The German Penal Code also outlaws public statements that
deny or call into question the historical fact of the Holocaust. The
Federal Court of Justice in Germany has held that statements,
books, or other propaganda denying the existence of the

210.

Article 21(2) of the Basic Law provides for banning political parties that

"seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order." GG art. 21(2), Karpen
at 236.

211. See supratext accompanying notes 175-84.
212. Stephen Kinzer, Germany Outlaws a Neo-Nazi Group, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 1992, at Al.
213. The neo-Nazi group known as the Nationalist Front was banned by the
German government on November 27, 1992. Id. at A8.
214. See AU Things Considered, supranote 119.
215. Id.
216. See Jonathan Kaufman, As Neo-Nazis Riot; Germany Still Outlaws the
Swastika, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4, 1993, at 1.
217. See Robin Gedve, Denying the Existence of the HolocaustIs a Crime in
Germany, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, September 22, 1994, at 16.
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Holocaust 218 have no social value and, therefore, constitute an
Two recent German court
insult under the Penal Code. 2 19
decisions highlight the tension between suppressing statements
In March
denying the Holocaust and freedom of expression.
1994, the Federal Court of Justice stated that a denial of the
Holocaust alone did not constitute the crime of inciting racial
hatred. Instead, the court required lower courts to determine if
the defendants, by propagating the Auschwitz Lie, committed the
separate offense of insult to the dignity of Jews. 220 In April 1994,
however, Germany's constitutional court ruled that freedom of
expression does not apply to groups propagating the Auschwitz
Lie. The court held that denying the existence of the Holocaust
denied a fact and that the severity of the insult to the Jewish
the right to freedom of speech
community rendered

218. See generally Stein, supranote 102 (discussing efforts to deny that the
Holocaust took place).
219. References to the German court decision are found in X. v. Federal
Republic of Germany, App. No. 9235/81, 29 Eur. Corm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 194,

195-96 (1982).
220.

Holocaust Denial Not Covered by Free Speech, supra note 103. This

case originated in the German state of Mannheim. In 1992, G-inther Deckert,
head of the right wing National Democratic Party, interpreted and expanded upon
a lecture given by Fred Leuchter, a leader of the United States Holocaust denial
movement The Mannheim court, upon remand by the Federal Court of Justice,
convicted Deckert but suspended his one-year sentence. The court stated that
Deckert probably would not repeat the crime, now that he knew denying the
existence of the Holocaust was against the law.
Upon its official publication in August 1994, the Deckert sentence suspension
developed into one of Germany's worst legal scandals, as the published decision
described Deckert admirably and appeared to condone his behavior.
Furthermore, the panel incited sharper criticism both domestically and abroad by
describing Deckert as a "nationalist," not an anti-Semite. In an apparent attempt
to quell the uproar over the decision, Wolfgang Mueller and Rainer Orlet, two of
the three judges who presided over the Deckert sentence suspension, were
relieved from their duties on the Mannheim bench approximately one week after
the decision was published. Mueller was reinstated in Mannheim after a five week
suspension. Orlet, on the other hand, remained suspended, ostensibly because
of health-related problems. See Gedve, supranote 217, at 16. See also Thorn
Shanker, German Holocaust Cases Stymie Courts: Small Party Provokes Legal
Dispute, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1994, at 6; Craig R. Whitney, German Court Criticized
for Its Treatment of a HolocaustSkeptic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1994, at A8.
The Federal Court of Justice expressed its own disapproval of the Mannheim
court's decision to suspend Deckert's sentence. In December 1994, the court
overturned the suspension of Deckert's sentence on the ground that it was wholly
insufficient for Deckert's crime, and the court remanded the sentencing to a
regional court in Karlsruhe. See Steve Vogel, New Sentence Ordered For German
Neo-Nazi; Suspended Jail Term Had Drawn Protests, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1994,
at A42.
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inapplicable. 2 21 Thus, courts may find that the German Penal
2 22
Code proscribes speech denying the existence of the Holocaust.
The German courts' inconsistent decisions regarding the
applicability of Germany's laws of incitement to racial hatred and
insult to those who deny the Holocaust have led to calls for
reform of Germany's criminal provisions. In September 1994,
after months of national debate and speculation, 2 23 the German
parliament passed a bill that explicitly outlaws denying or casting
doubt upon the existence of the Holocaust. 2 2 4 This provision,
which makes denial of the Holocaust punishable by up to five
years imprisonment,2 2 5 is substantially tougher than the one-year
maximum sentence imposed by Germany's law prohibiting
2 26
incitement to racial hatred.
V. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO THE NAZI ERA

A prudent and watchful international community emerging
from the Second World War quickly responded to a recovering
Germany with legal measures intended to declare its intolerance
of the atrocities committed by the Nazis. The United Nations
Charter itself, enacted in 1948, proclaims equality for all men and
22 7
women and upholds the dignity and worth of all individuals.
In addition, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, 228 which sought "a common standard of

221. HolocaustDenialNot Covered by Free Speech, supranote 103.
222. Court Denies Free Speech to Neo-Nazis, CI. SUN-TIMES, April 27, 1994,
at 31.
223. National outrage and controversy resulted from both the March 1994
ruling by the Federal Court of Justice, which stated that denying the Holocaust's
existence did not alone constitute inciting racial hatred, and the August 1994
publication of the Mannheim court's suspension of Holocaust denier G-inther
Deckert's sentence. The ruling by the Federal Court of Justice, which overturned
and remanded a lower court's conviction of Deckert, sparked calls for a law
explicitly outlawing public denial of the Holocaust. By May, a law criminalizing
denial of the Holocaust, punishable by up to three years in prison, was presented
to the German Bundestag where it quickly won unanimous approval. Although
widely expected to be enacted, the bill was defeated when the upper house of
parliament objected to elements unrelated to the Holocaust provision. However,
the parliament subsequently passed the bill in September 1994. See Nazi
Apologist Re-Convicted German Court, B.C. CYCLE, June 22, 1994; Elizabeth
Neuffer, German Legislators Vote to Criminalize Holocaust Denial, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 21, 1994, at 2; JailThreat Over 'Auschwitz Lie,' DAILY MAIL, May 14, 1994, at
5.
224. See Gedve, supranote 217, at 6.
225. Id.
226. SeeStGB art. 131(1).
227. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
228. See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
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achievement for all peoples and all nations."2 29 Generally, the
Universal Declaration provides that all humans are born free and
equal, 2 30 and it declares a universal right to freedom from
discrimination on the basis of race, sex or religion. 2 3 1 Other
measures taken by the international community took the form of
Parties to these agreements,
covenants and conventions.
including Germany, are bound by their terms as a matter of

international law. Accordingly, these measures may be applicable
to the neo-Nazis who advocate racial hatred in Germany today.
A. Conventions

1. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
23 2
of Racial Discrimination (Racial Discrimination Convention),
which entered into force on January 4, 1969, represents one of
several attempts by the international community to promote
human rights and equality in the post-war period. Article 1 of the
Racial Discrimination Convention defines discrimination as "any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
an equal footing, of human rights and
enjoyment or exercise, on
2
fundamental freedoms." 3
2
Under Article 4 of the Racial Discrimination Convention, 3
freedom of expression, particularly for "groups which preach race
Universal Declaration, supra note 8, pmbl. While the Universal
229.
Declaration is non-binding as a body of international law, many scholars argue
that it commands the force of customary international law because of its
See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Race, Sex, and Religious
universal recognition.
Discriminationin InternationalLaw, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATONAL LAW 310
(Theodor Meron ed., 1984); see also Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International
Law, 87 AM. J. INI% L. 529, 533 (1993).
UniversalDeclaration,supranote 8, art. 1.
230.
231. Id. art. 2.
232. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 212 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)

[hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention].
233. Id. art. 1(I).
234. Article 4 provides:
State parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are
based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of
one colour or ethnic group, or which attempt to justify or promote racial
hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate
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hatred,"2 5 must yield to human rights concerns.
Article 4
declares that "all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well
as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts" are
punishable. 2 36 In addition, Article 4 outlaws all organizations
that promote or incite such racial discrimination. 2 3 7 Therefore,
states adopting this provision must weigh the Convention's
restrictions on ideas against their own notion of freedom of
238
expression.
2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention),2 3 9 a direct response to
the Nazi atrocities, was the first human rights convention adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly. 24 ° The Convention

defines genocide as any "acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group"2 41 through a variety of means, including murder,
injury, eugenics, and forcible child transfers. 2 42 This definition is
nearly identical to the German Penal Code's criminalization of
genocide. 2 43 In addition, Article III of the Genocide Convention
states that "direct and public incitement to commit genocide"
shall be punishable, 2 4 4 again restricting traditional notions of free
speech.

and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of,
such discrimination ....
Id. art. 4.
235. Greenberg, supranote 229, at 324.
236. Racial Discrimination Convention, supranote 232, art. 4(a).
237. Id. art. 4(b).
238.
See generally Thomas David Jones, Article 4 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 23 HOW. L. J. 429 (1980) (discussing the trade-off between liberty

and prevention of discrimination).
239. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
240. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A
Response to Hate Speech, 29 STAN.J. INIL L. 57, 90 (1992). Genocide was already
recognized as a crime by Resolution 96I) of the General Assembly in 1946. G.A.
Res. 96(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. a/64/Add.1 (1946).

241.
242.
243.
244.

Genocide Convention, supra note 8,art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
Id.
See supra part IV.B.4 and accompanying notes.
Genocide Convention, supra note 8, art. III, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
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3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
2 45
In addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Europe has adopted its own treaty to address human rights
abuses. In 1949 and 1950, the Council of Europe 2 41 drafted the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention), which entered into force in
The European Convention, which established the
1953.247
European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court
of Human Rights, 248 was ratified by West Germany in 1952 and
incorporated into federal law in that same year. 24 9 Today, the
European Convention is recognized as the "world's most
law for the protection of
successful system of international
2 50
human rights currently in force."
Three articles in the European Convention bear directly on
freedom of expression and its possible limitations. First, Article

10 guarantees the right to freedom of expression,2 5 1 but limits
this right by proclaiming that it includes "duties and
responsibilities"

that

may

restrict

it

when

"necessary

in

a

democratic society."2 5 2 Second, Article 17 provides that the rights

guaranteed in the Convention may not be exercised to the

See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
245.
The Council of Europe was established on May 5, 1949. See Defeis,
246.
supranote 240, at 94 n.190.
247. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
[hereinafter European Convention].
248. The Commission accepts and reviews applications from those seeking
redress from the European Court of Human Rights. The Commission publishes
its own decisions regarding whether to forward the party's complaint to the court.
For a detailed discussion of the procedures established by the European
Convention, see Rosalyn Higgins, The European Convention on Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 505-11 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984).
FOSIER, supranote 4, at 62.
249.
Defeis, supranote 240, at 95.
250.
European Convention, supra note 247, art. 10(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
251.
Id. art. 10(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230. The full text of Article 10(2) reads:
252.
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities,may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Id. (emphasis added).
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detriment of the rights of another.2 5 3
Finally, Article 14
recognizes that the rights upheld in the Convention "shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, . . . religion, political or other opinion."254

While the

European Convention does not explicitly prohibit speech
promoting racial hatred, the decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights, according to one commentator, tend to "support
the position that such restrictions are permissible and indeed
25 5
encouraged."
B. Implicationsfor IndividualLiberties
International tribunals impose a balancing test similar to the
German courts in deciding freedom of speech cases. By invoking
the "duties and responsibilities" clause of the European
Convention, 25 6 courts weigh the value of the speech against the
speaker's duty and responsibility to society in making that
speech. 25 7 Both the European Court of Human Rights and the

European Commission of Human Rights have aggressively upheld
restrictions on freedom of expression when the restrictions would
curtail the spread of Nazi views.
For example, in Kosiek v. Germany,25 8 the European Court of
Human Rights upheld Germany's decision not to offer Mr. Kosiek
a civil service teaching position because he supported in writing
the aims of the National Democratic Party of Germany, 25 9 which
Germany found to be "inimical" to its Basic Law. 2 60 In another
case, the European Commission of Human Rights ruled that the
German Federal Court of Justice's conviction of a propagator of
the Holocaust "myth"2 6 ' deserved no recourse to the guarantee of
freedom of expression in Article 10 of the European
253.

Id. art. 17, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234. Article 17 provides:

Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein
or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.

ICL
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 233.
Defeis, supranote 240, at 103.
European Convention, supranote 247, art. 10(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.

Id.
Kosiek v.Germany, 105 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1986).
Kosiek was a leader in the National Democratic Party of Germany

(NDP), which the West Germany government considered to be an extremist rightwing party. See LEWIS, supranote 11, at 47.
260. Kosiek, 105 Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) at 11.
261.

See supratext accompanying note 102-06.
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application to the court
Convention, 26 2 deeming the propagator's
2
to be "manifestly ill-founded." 63
Finally, in 1988, the European Commission of Human Rights
reviewed an application from Michael Kfihnen, a militant neo-Nazi
leader who represents the voice of the young neo-Nazi
generation. 264

A German court26 5 had found Kfihnen guilty of

disseminating propaganda by means of unconstitutional
organizations in violation of Article 86 of the German Penal
Code. 2 66 The German court held that his pamphlets, which
advocated the reinstitution of the Nazi Party, clearly violated the
basic order of freedom and democracy. 26 7 In applying to the
Commission, Kfihnen alleged that German authorities had denied
2 68 guaranteed by Article 10.269
him the freedom of expression
The Commission refused to forward the application to the
European Court of Human Rights and deemed Germany's
interference with Kfihnen's expression under Article 86 of the
Penal Code "necessary in a democratic society"2 70within the
meaning of Article 10(2) of the European Convention.

262.
European Convention, supranote 247, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
263. X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 9235/81, 29 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 194, 199 (1982).
Kfihnen v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 12194/86, 56 Eur.
264.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 205 (1988). Kihnen, who organized the neo-Nazi
group ANS/NA (Aktionsfront NationalerSozialisten/NationaleAktivisten) central in
this matter before the Commission, has been described as "the driving force in
the development of the most visual [sic] neo-Nazi organizations in the Federal
Republic of Germany during the late 1970s and early 1980s... [His] overt use of
Nazi sloganism and memorabilia placed him at the forefront of the German neoNazi movement." LEWIS, supra note 11, at 94.
Kfihnen appeared before the Frankfort Regional Court. See 56 Eur.
265.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 206.
266. Id. at 206-07. Section 86 of the Penal Code provides in pertinent part:
Whoever... produces for distribution... propaganda:
1.
of a political party which has been held unconstitutional...
or...
. . . the contents of which is designed to further the
4.
aspirations of a former National Socialist organization shall be punished
by up to three years' imprisonment or by fine.
StGB art.
267.
268.
269.
270.

86(1).
56 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 207.
European Convention, supra note 247, art. 10(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
56 Eur. Conm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 208.
Id.at 210.
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VI. EFFECT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF LAWS

The legal measures adopted by West Germany in the period
immediately following World War II have been used to combat the
resurgence of Nazism nearly a half century later. Domestic laws
and international agreements have infringed upon the individual
liberties of Germans by proscribing neo-Nazi propaganda and hate
speech, banning neo-Nazi political parties, and outlawing neoNazi symbols and slogans.
The German government's attempt to combat Nazism through
the invocation of specific laws has had the unanticipated effect of
promoting the message the government seeks to suppress.
Instead of eradicating the message of the neo-Nazis, the German
government has simply compelled them to convey their ideas
through different channels and by different means. Therefore, the
effectiveness of the foregoing measures in quashing the neo-Nazis'
views remains unclear.
For example, when the government initially banned certain
Nazi symbols and slogans, it unwittingly prompted the neo-Nazis
to change these forms of expression subtly in order to avoid
prosecution. 27 1 The neo-Nazis circumvented these laws by

creating new symbols and slogans clearly recognizable as Nazi

emblems.2 7 2 The German government then modified its ban on
Nazi symbols and slogans to encompass anything that might even
3
resemble Nazi symbols and slogans. 27
This ad hoc approach to suppressing the neo-Nazis' message
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of laws specifically designed to
contain these extremists. The next logical step for neo-Nazis who
wish to maintain both an identity and a battle cry is to adopt
insignias and slogans that are not rooted in traditional Nazi
symbols. Over time, these new symbols may become as clearly
associated with the neo-Nazi cause as the original Nazi symbols.
Likewise, banning neo-Nazi political parties 2 74 has not solved
the immediate problem facing the German government, namely,
the resurgence of Nazism.
Banning the parties, of course,
prevents neo-Nazis from participating in and winning official state
elections. Declaring these parties unconstitutional, however, has
encouraged neo-Nazis to affiliate with more mainstream groups.
For example, in August 1994 the German People's Union, an
ultra-nationalist party deemed unconstitutional by the German
government, formed an alliance with the right-wing German

271.
272.
273.
274.

See Kaufman, supra note 216, at 1.
See supratext accompanying notes 214-17.
See Gedve, supra note 217, at 16.
See supratext accompanying notes 210-13.
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Republican party.2 75 As a result, the German People's Union has
a new and legitimate means by which to further its own cause
and spread its message.
Moreover, banning political parties may also drive the parties
further underground, making it more difficult for German
Parties that cease
authorities to monitor their activities. 2 76
operating as vote-garnering organizations may instead focus on
covert activities, such as violence and the dissemination of
propaganda. Neo-Nazis have turned to the electronic media of
personal computers in order to disseminate their outlawed
literature and spread their ideas directly into the homes of the
German people. By resorting to such high-tech means, the neoNazis effectively evade the surveillance of the government because
networks
are
virtually
over
computer
transmissions
277
untraceable.
Laws proscribing certain types of speech may not curtail the
While the German government
ideas behind the speech.
continues to increase the scope of prohibited expression,2 78 such
as prohibiting the denial of the Holocaust, this expression has
found new outlets. Neo-Nazis who promote their ideas through
traditional channels of communication may nevertheless evade
prosecution by invoking euphemisms as code words for anti-

Semitic rhetoric.

Such tactics provide a means of public

communication that is both powerful and, more importantly,
legal.
Finally, even when the neo-Nazis do not disguise their
messages, they may nevertheless pass constitutional muster.
Identifying and outlawing both symbols, such as the swastika,
and neo-Nazi groups, such as the Nationalist Front, is relatively
easy; if a symbol is clearly associated with Nazism or the group
unmistakably supports Nazism, then the symbol or group is
prohibited.2 79 Yet some determinations are not so easily made.
For example, in 1993 a documentary film was released about the
life of Bela Ewald Althans, one of the leaders of the current neoIn the film, Althans "launches into a
Nazi movement.2 80

This alliance prompted German
See Atkdnson, supra note 111.
275.
authorities to place the Republican Party under federal surveillance for anticonstitutional activities. Id.
See Kinzer, Germany Outlaws a Neo-Nazi Group, supra note 212, at Ai;
276.
see also Whitney, supranote 80, at Al.
277.
See Neuffer, supranote 114, at 1.
278.
See supratext accompanying notes 217, 224.
279.
See GG art. 21(2); StGB art. 131.
In December 1994, Althans was sentenced to 18 months in prison for
280.
spreading pro-Nazi propaganda and insulting the memory of Jews killed by the
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monologue" asserting that accounts of mass gassings at
Auschwitz were a complete hoax.28 1
Although labeled a
documentary, the eighty-three minute film was shot entirely
without commentary or rebuttal, prompting some to liken the film
to "pure propaganda." 28 2
Although charges of racism and
promoting violent acts were eventually dropped, 2 83 the debate
over the boundary between freedom of artistic expression and
propaganda continues.
VII. CONCLUSION

Germany is struggling to rid itself of its Nazi past and to
suppress those who resolve to keep this past alive. In the postwar occupation period, the Allies tried to eliminate the vestiges of
Nazism in Germany through the denazification program. Yet
thousands of neo-Nazis are active in Germany today.
As
reunification with East Germany creates increasing social unrest,
neo-Nazi groups across Germany are beginning to flourish and
pose a direct threat to the social and political welfare of the state.
Despite a menu of provisions both in Germany's Basic Law and
Penal Code and in the various international conventions it has
adopted, Germany still faces a formidable and dangerous neo-Nazi
population within its borders.
The effectiveness of the legal measures designed to combat
the growing neo-Nazi threat may be improved. First, German
courts could factor this growing threat into their constitutional
balancing process, weighing neo-Nazis' words and deeds more
heavily in light of an ever more fragile free democratic basic order.
The European Court of Human Rights performs a similar
balancing approach under the European Convention, 28 4 and this
court could adopt a standard comparable to that proposed for the
German courts.
Although such measures arguably do not
promote uninhibited political discourse, neither do they promote
speech that questions the existence of the Holocaust. Second,
Article 18 of the German Basic Law could be applied, under which
a convicted abuser of freedoms of expression forfeits his basic

Nazis. Neo-Nazi Faces Retrialfor Denial of the Holocaust, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Dec. 16, 1994, at 14.
281. Stephen Kinzer, Germans Ask If Film Hurts or Aids Nazis, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1993, atA17.
282. Id.
283. Neo-NaziDocu FansMedia Brouhaha,VARIETY, Jan. 10, 1994, at 56.
284. See supratext accompanying notes 245.
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rights altogether. 28 5 This provision, however, has never been
2 86
invoked.
At the expense of eradicating Nazism in Germany, many basic
rights and individual liberties characteristic of a democratic
society have been abridged. The Basic Law and the Penal Code
provide the primary means for fighting neo-Nazism in Germany,
often by prohibiting certain forms of expression and association.
Thus, certain books, symbols, slogans, and types of speech have
been banned as they were deemed to incite racial hatred or to
threaten the German free democratic basic order. Similarly,
certain political parties have been declared unconstitutional for
the undemocratic views they profess.
According to one
commentator, while attempts to regulate the neo-Nazis' actions
inevitably involve an infringement on expression, these
infringements may be justified because hate speech never led to
28 7
consequences as terrible as it once did in Germany.
Ultimately, the German government's prohibition of neo-Nazi
expression and association may have unanticipated results.
While suppression of speech may indeed quiet the extreme views
of the neo-Nazis in the public fora, the neo-Nazis will not
disappear, nor will suppression of their speech alter their views or
values. Instead, such suppression may actually drive these neoNazis into the mainstream where their expression is less drastic,
but their underlying message is the same.
Neo-Nazis may
disguise their

extremist views in more politically

palatable

rhetoric. Thus, their speech may not incite racial hatred overtly,
but may engender it subtly. Similarly, the neo-Nazis may not
derive their symbols from the Nazi regime itself, but instead may
use symbols reminiscent of the Nazi era generally. Finally, their
ideas may be channeled through accepted, constitutional parties
who affiliate with the neo-Nazis. Thus, the real danger is that a
new generation of neo-Nazis, with a disguised message, may find
broader appeal and an even greater audience across Germany.
David E. Weiss

285. See supranote 141 and accompanying text.
286. See Fisher, supra note 88, at A33.
287. All Things Considered, supra note 119 (remarks of Professor Andreas
Heldrich, University of Munich).

